Abstract. An approach of membership revocation in group signatures is verifier-local revocation (VLR for short). In this approach, only verifiers are involved in the revocation mechanism, while signers have no involvement. Thus, since signers have no load, this approach is suitable for mobile environments. Although Boneh and Shacham recently proposed a VLR group signature scheme from bilinear maps, this scheme does not satisfy the backward unlikability. The backward unlikability means that even after a member is revoked, signatures produced by the member before the revocation remain anonymous. In this paper, we propose VLR group signature schemes with the backward unlinkability from bilinear maps.
Introduction
A group signature scheme [10, 8, 1, 15, 2, 9, 16, 13, 6, 7, 14] allows a group member to anonymously sign a message on behalf of a group, where a group manager controls the membership of members. Then, often a third party can cancel the anonymity of signatures to trace the signers. Some schemes support membership revocation [15, 2, 9, 16, 6, 7] , where the membership of a member can be disabled without influencing the other members. This paper focuses on the membership revocation. The simplest revocation method is that the manager changes the group public key and secret keys of all members except the revoked member to re-distribute the keys [2] . However, the other members' loads are enormous. A better solution is to broadcast a small public membership message to all signers and verifiers, as in [9, 16, 6] . Although the costs of signers are better, the signer still has to obtain some data depending on the size of the group (or the number of revoked members) whenever signing. On the other hand, there is another approach [15, 2, 7] , where some revocation messages are only sent to verifiers, although the verifiers need the computational cost depending the number of revoked members. Since the signers' costs are lower, this type is suitable for mobile environments where mobile hosts anonymously communicate with the servers. We refer to this type as Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR for short) group signature scheme, as in [7] .
In [15, 2] , VLR group signature schemes based on the strong RSA assumption are proposed. However, the schemes have some drawbacks on efficiency. The first scheme of [15] and the scheme of [2] suffer from the inefficiency of signing, due to the used inefficient zero-knowledge proofs. The second scheme of [15] forces a signer to compute O(T ) exponentiations at every time interval, where T is the total number of time intervals. Since the revocation can be performed only at the beginning of each time interval, T should be large. This means the signer's heavy load.
In [7] , a VLR group signature scheme based on bilinear maps is proposed by Boneh and Shacham. The advantage of this scheme is that signatures are short, since the elliptic curves can be adopted. On the other hand, the schemes of [15, 2] have an advantage over [7] , backward unlinkability. This property means that even after a member is revoked, signatures produced by the member before the revocation remain anonymous. However, in the scheme of [7] , all the signatures produced from the revoked member are linkable. This means that the anonymity of signatures produced before the revocation is compromised. In some cases that all signatures from an illegal person should be traced, the linkability is useful, as well as traceable signatures in [13] . However, the linkability is undesirable in most cases. In case a member leaves voluntarily, the anonymity of signatures before leaving should be ensured. This is the same in case a member's secret key is stolen.
In this paper, we propose VLR group signature schemes from bilinear maps, which moreover satisfy the backward unlinkability. In the schemes, the concept of time intervals is adopted, as [15] . For each member, there are revocation tokens of all intervals 1, . . . , T . When a revocation happens at interval j * , the revocation tokens of the member at all j ≥ j * are sent to verifiers. Then, signatures after j * (including j * ) can be detected, while signatures before j * remain anonymous. Therefore, the backward unlinkability holds. Since the proposed schemes adopt only efficient zero-knowledge proofs, signing process is efficient. Moreover, a signer does not need any computation depending on T .
We first propose a basic VLR group signatures scheme, and prove the security. In the basic scheme, a group manager publishes revocation tokens at every interval. Thus, the total data of the revocation tokens published up to a proceeded interval becomes very long. Therefore, we propose an extended scheme, where the total data size is reduced at the sacrifice of the signer's slight cost. 
Definition 3 (Traceability).
Traceability requires that for all PPT A, the probability that A wins the traceability game is negligible.
The following BU-anonymity requirement captures the anonymity with the backward unlinkability. Consider the following BU-anonymity game. 
Setup

Preliminaries
Bilinear Groups
Our scheme utilizes bilinear groups and bilinear maps as follows:
1. G 1 , G 2 and G are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, 2. g 1 is a generator of G 1 , and g 2 is a generator of G 2 , 3. ψ is an efficiently computed isomorphism from
. e is an efficiently computed bilinear map:
Hereafter, for simplicity, we consider only the case of G 1 = G 2 , and we set G = G 1 = G 2 , and g = g 1 = g 2 . Our scheme can be extended to the case of G 1 = G 2 , as [7] .
Assumptions
Our scheme is based on the q-SDH assumption [6, 7] and the DBDH assumption [4] in G.
Definition 5 (q-SDH assumption). For all PPT algorithm A , the probability
is negligible, where γ ∈ R Z * p .
Definition 6 (Decision BDH (DBDH) assumption). For all PPT algorithm A, the probability
|Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) abc ) = 0] − Pr[A(g, g a , g b , g c , e(g, g) d ) = 0| is negligible, where a, b, c, d ∈ R Z * p .
Proving Relations on Representations
As well as [6, 7] , we adopt signatures converted by Fiat-Shamir heuristic (using a hash function) from zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge (P K), where a signer can convince a verifier of knowledge with relations on representations. We call the signatures SP Ks. The SP Ks we adopt are the generalization of the Schnorr signature, and the underlying P Ks are basically derived from [11, 12, 8] . We introduce the following notation.
which means a signature of message M by a signer who knows secret values x 1 , . . . , x t satisfying a relation R(x 1 , . . . , x t ). In this paper, the following SP Ks on G, G are utilized.
SP K of representation:
An SP K proving the knowledge of a representation of C ∈ G to the bases
This can be also constructed on group G .
SP K of representations with equal parts:
An SP K proving the knowledge of representations of C, C ∈ G to the bases g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ G on message M , where the representations include equal values as parts, is denoted as 
where C, g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ G, and C , g 1 , . . . , g t ∈ G .
In the random oracle model, the SP K can be simulated without the knowledge using a simulator in the zero-knowledge-ness of the underlying P K. Moreover, the SP K has an extractor of the proved secret knowledge given two accepting protocol views whose commitments are the same and whose challenges are different.
Proposed Scheme
Idea
The scheme of [7] is intuitively as follows. For group public key gpk = (g, g γ ), an SDH pair (A i = g 1/(γ+xi) , x i ) is secret key gsk[i] of member i, which is unforgeable without γ. Then, group signature of member i consists of T 1 = u r A i and T 2 = v r , where u, v ∈ R G and r ∈ R Z * p , and the SP K proving the correctness. The revocation token of member i is A i . By checking e(T 1 /A, v) = e(u, T 2 ) for all revocation tokens A, it can be checked whether T 1 includes a token of a revoked member.
The proposed scheme is an extension of [7] . To the public key, we add h j ∈ G for all 1 ≤ j ≤ T , and the secret key is the same. Then, the group signature is modified into T 3 = e(g xi , h j ) r , T 4 = g r and the SP K proving the correctness and the ownership of A i corresponding x i . The revocation token at interval j is B ij = h xi j . Then, by checking T 3 = e(T 4 , B) for all revocation tokens B at interval j, it can be checked whether T 3 includes a token of a revoked member. On the other hand, the revocation tokens at different interval j do not satisfy the above checking. Moreover, the computation from a token h xi j at j to another h xi j at j is infeasible. Therefore, backward unlinkability is achieved.
Proposed Algorithms
KeyGen(n, T ): This key generation algorithm is given the number of members and the number of time intervals, and computes keys as follows.
Select a generator
The group public key gpk is (g,g, h 1 , . . . h T , w) . Each member's secret key gsk[i] is (A i , x i ) . The revocation token at interval j of member with secret Output (gpk, gsk, grt) .
The inputs of this signing algorithm are gpk = (g,g, h 1 , . . . h T , w), the current time interval j, the signer's secret gsk[i] = (A i , x i ) and a signed message M ∈ {0, 1} * . Hereafter, we assume that M includes the time interval j in order to bind the signature to the interval. The algorithm is as follows:
The detail of this SP K is shown in Section 4.3.
Output the group signature σ = ( 
Detail of the SP K
The SP K V in the algorithm Sign is computed as the following SP K V .
This SP K can be computed by the SP K for the representations, where = x i α, ζ = x i β, and η = x i δ are adopted. What we require is to prove that the SP K V is equivalent to V . The following lemma ensures the equivalence. , g) .
such knowledge can be extracted. From the equations (1), (2) On the other hand, from equations (5), (6), we obtain g η = g xiδ . Therefore, from equation (4), we can extract knowledge x i , δ s.t. T 3 = e(g xi , h j ) δ .
Details of Sign and Verify Algorithms
For efficiency consideration, this subsection describes the Sign and Verify algorithms of the proposed scheme in Section 4.2, where the SP Ks for representations shown in Section 4.3 are described in details. The construction of each SP K for a representation is similar to that in [7] or Schnorr based SP Ks on groups with known orders. Thus, we omit the proof that underlying P Ks of following SP Ks are zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge.
Sign(gpk, j, gsk[i], M ):
1. Select randoms α, β, δ ∈ R Z * p , and set = x i α, ζ = x i β, and η = x i δ.
(a) Pick blinding factors r α , r β , r δ , r xi , r , r ζ , r η ∈ R Z p .
(b) Compute
(c) Compute a challenge c ∈ Z p using a hash function H that is regarded as a random oracle.
Output the group signature σ = (
Verify(gpk, j, RL j , σ, M ):
1. Signature check. Check that σ is valid, by checking the SP K V , as follows.
(a) Retrievẽ
(b) Check the challenge c:
2. Revocation check. Check that the signer is not revoked at the interval j,
Signature Length. This group signature includes 3 elements from G, 1 element from G and 8 elements from Z p . When an elliptic curve is used as well as [7] , p is 170 bits, elements of G are 171 bits, and elements of G is 1020 bits. In that case, this group signature is 2893 bits or 362 bytes.
Performance. The signature generation requires 10 multi-exponentiations and 1 bilinear map computation (plus 3 bilinear map computations that can be pre-computed). The verification requires 6 multi-exponentiations and 2 + |RL j | bilinear map computations (plus 4 bilinear map computations that can be precomputed).
Security
Since the correctness is straightforward, only BU-anonymity and traceability are shown.
BU-Anonymity Theorem 1. The proposed scheme satisfies the BU-anonymity in the random oracle model under the DBDH assumption.
The following lemma implies the above theorem. 
Lemma 2. Suppose adversary
B decides which Z it is given by communicating with A, as follows.
Setup. B simulates KeyGen(n, T ) as follows.
1. Signing queries: B computes a simulated group signature of i * , as follows.
3. B computes the simulated SP K V by using the simulator of the perfect zero-knowledge-ness, which includes the backpatch of the hash function. If the backpatch is failure, B outputs a random guess ω ∈ R {0, 1} and aborts. Then, B responds signature σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T 4 , V ) to A. Note that each value in σ has the same distribution as the real, since α, β ∈ R Z * p in the real and T 1 , T 2 ∈ R G in the simulation, and due to the perfect zeroknowledge-ness of SP K. Revocation queries: If j = j * , B responds B i * j . Otherwise (i.e., j = j * ), B outputs a random guess ω ∈ R {0, 1} and aborts. Corruption queries: B outputs a random guess ω ∈ R {0, 1} and aborts. Challenge. A outputs a message M , the current time interval j and two members i 0 , i 1 to be challenged. If j = j * , B outputs a random guess ω ∈ R {0, 1} and aborts. Otherwise, B picks φ ∈ R {0, 1}. Then, if i φ = i * , B outputs a random guess ω ∈ R {0, 1} and aborts. Otherwise, B responds the following simulated group signature of i * and j * . 1. B regards c as δ, which is unknown.
. B computes the simulated SP K V by using the simulator of the perfect zero-knowledge-ness. Phase 2. This is the same as Phase 1.
Output. A outputs its guess
, and otherwise outputs ω = 0 (implying Putting everything together, we obtain the advantage of B's guess, as follows.
In the rest, we evaluate Pr [abort] . If the guesses of i * and j * are correct, B aborts only when the backpatch is failure in the signing query. The probability that a specific signature causes the failure is at most q H /p, as well as [7] . Thus, for all signature queries, the probability that B aborts due to the failure of the backpatch is at most q S q H /p. On the other hand, since A has no information on i * and j * and φ ∈ R {0, 1}, the probability that B correctly guesses i * and j * is at least 1/nT . Thus, Pr
Therefore, the advantage that B' guesses ω is at least (1/nT − q S q H /p) .
Traceability
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme satisfies the traceability in the random oracle model under the SDH assumption.
Lemma 3. Suppose adversary
Proof sketch. This is similar to the proof in [7] . Consider the following framework with A. Then, there are two types of forger on the above framework. Type 1 forger forges a signature of the member who is different from all i. Type 2 forger forges a signature of the member i whose corruption is not requested.
Setup. It is given
At first, modify h 1 , . . . , h T as follows. Consider a k-ary tree with two levels for an integer k s.t. T ≤ k 2 (see Fig. 1 ). Although we show only the case of two levels, the extension to more levels is easy. In the tree, the root node is N 0 , N j1 is the j 1 -th child of N 0 , and N j1j2 is the j 2 -th child of N j1 , for j 1 , j 2 ∈ [1, k] . Each node N j1 is assigned to h j1 ∈ R G, and each node N j1j2 is assigned to h j1j2 ∈ R G. In this situation, every interval j ∈ [1, T ] can be correspondent to a pair of two indexes j 1 and j 2 for j 1 , j 2 ∈ [1, k] such that j = j 1 k + j 2 . Then, the next interval of (j 1 , j 2 ) is (j 1 , j 2 + 1) unless j 2 = k, and if j 2 = k, the next interval is (j 1 + 1, 1) . In each interval (j 1 , j 2 ), the values h j1 and h j1j2 along the path are used.
...
N kk
Fig. 1. A k-ary tree with two levels.
A group signature on message M by member i at interval (j 1 , j 2 ) is computed as
The difference between the basic scheme and this extended scheme is the parts T 3 , T 4 , T 3 , T 4 and V . On the other hand, revocation token B i(j1,j2) for member i at interval (j 1 , j 2 ) is a pair (B ij1 = h xi j1 , B ij1j2 = h xi j1j2 ). Then, for B ij1j2 , by checking T 3 = e(T 4 , B ij1j2 ), it can be detected whether a group signature was made by member i at interval (j 1 , j 2 ). On the other hand, for B ij1 , by checking T 3 = e(T 4 , B ij1 ), group signatures of i at intervals (j 1 , * ) can be detected, where * means any value of [1, k] . Namely, one level of tokens (the upper level, tokens of the form B ij1 ) allows to revoke an user during k ≈ √ T time intervals at once. Consider how to publish the revocation tokens as follows. Assume that member i is revoked at interval (j * In the extended scheme, the manager has only to publish revocation tokens per k ≈ √ T intervals, except for the initial overhead (i.e., the publication of B ij * 1 j2 ). Thus, the total size of revocation tokens in public directory is sufficiently reduced. On the other hand, the signer has to compute T 3 , T 4 and the corresponding SP K additionally. The communication overhead is 1531 bits and the computational overhead is 6 exponentiations (plus 1 bilinear map computations that can be pre-computed). The security of the extended scheme can be easily proved in the similar way to the basic one.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the bilinear maps, we have proposed a VLR group signature scheme with the backward unlinkability, and extended it to a scheme where the published revocation tokens are reduced.
In the proposed scheme, after a revocation, the revoked member remains excluded forever. However, it is easily extended to the scheme where the member is excluded only for specific intervals. This property is useful in some applications.
An open problem is to construct a shorter VLR group signature scheme with the backward unlinkability. Our group signature includes an elements of G , which is longer than elements of G. It is better to construct a signature from only elements of G.
